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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

18 FEB 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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
18 February 1970  
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FBI'S TRENDS  
18 FEBRUARY 1970

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 FEBRUARY 1970

Moscow (3537 items)

Middle East	(5%)	10%
[Kosygin Notes	(--)	3%]
[Attack on UAR	(--)	2%]
Plant		
Vietnam	(11%)	5.5%
[Secretary	(0.1%)	2%]
Laird Visit		
Criticism of	(4%)	5%
China		
Czechoslovakia	(5%)	4%
French CP Congress	(5%)	4%

Peking (2921 items)

Domestic Issues	(48%)	48%
Downing of U.S.	(--)	11%
Pilotless Plane		
Over Hainan		
Middle East	(14%)	9%
[Chou Letter to	(7%)	4%]
Nasir		
Indian Internal	(3%)	5%
Struggles		
PLAF 9th Anniversary	(--)	4%
Criticism of USSR	(1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

## INTRODUCTION

Vietnamese communist attention to the Paris talks is confined to the VNA account of the 54th session on 12 February and to Liberation Radio's broadcast of PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's formal statement. VNA offers no explanation for the absence of Ha Van Lau, who has been speaking in Xuan Thuy's place since Ambassador Lodge's resignation. VNA says only that Nguyen Minh Vy spoke "on behalf of the DRV Government."\* Mme. Binh repeated the usual arguments that the United States intends to prolong the war through the Vietnamization program. And Vy repeated the charge that especially since his 3 November "war speech," President Nixon has given priority to Vietnamization while considering the course of negotiations at Paris secondary.

In addition to the usual attacks on Vietnamization by the communist delegates at Paris, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong routinely assailed the policy in remarks during a tour of the Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province on the occasion of Tet. According to VNA on 16 February, Dong called Vietnamization a U.S. effort to make up for repeated failures, use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese, and prolong the war. Secretary Laird's statements in the course of his 10-13 February visit to South Vietnam are cited by Hanoi and Liberation Radio as further evidence of the Nixon Administration's intention to prolong and step up the war.

Secretary Laird's comments on aerial reconnaissance of the DRV are denounced by Hanoi, which claims that in his Saigon press conference on the 13th Laird "let it be understood that while flying over North Vietnam, U.S. pilots have the right to fire first if they meet with danger." (Hanoi and Liberation Radio also quote him as saying U.S. troops in South Vietnam may also retaliate against Cambodia and Laos "if the Vietnamese communists attack from there.") On the 17th, Hanoi claims that a U.S. unmanned reconnaissance plane was downed the previous day over Vinh Phu Province, bringing the DRV total of downed planes to 3,353.

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\* Hanoi propaganda has not acknowledged Lau's departure for Hanoi. DRV delegation spokesman Le Quang Hiep explained in his post-session briefing that Lau had left on a "routine" trip, but Hanoi media as usual do not report the briefing. A 9 February VNA service message from Paris to the DRV embassy in Peking asked that reservations be made on the 14 February Peking-Hanoi flight for Ha Van Lau and one Dang San. This is Lau's first trip back to Hanoi since the opening of the expanded talks in January 1969.

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Continued Moscow criticism of Vietnamization focuses on Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon. Commentators say that Laird prepared an "optimistic" account of the progress of Vietnamization to calm antiwar critics at home; and reports of his 11 February Saigon press conference highlight his statement that U.S. combat troops would have to remain to protect support troops, while ignoring his statement that withdrawals would not pause when the U.S. force level reaches 250,000. Commentators also stress that he opposed the establishment of a precise deadline for troop withdrawal.

The ninth PLAF anniversary is marked by a meeting on the 12th in a "liberated area" of the South, addressed by PRG President Phat and PLAF deputy commander Mme. Dinh. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, absent from public view since November, is not listed as present.\* Front comment on the occasion stresses the correctness of the NFLSV and PRG political and military line. Hanoi marks the anniversary with a meeting, editorial comment, and the usual message from Defense Minister Giap. Peking propaganda includes reports of a meeting sponsored by the Ministry of Defense and a congratulatory message from Lin Biao pledging continued support of the Vietnamese. Neither the message nor other available Peking propaganda uses the occasion to attack the USSR, although Peking had aimed a vitriolic attack at the Soviets in propaganda on the 40th VWP anniversary on 3 February. Soviet media publicize a meeting in Moscow sponsored by the Soviet Committee in Support of Vietnam and carry press articles on the anniversary, but there is no mention of a congratulatory message from the Ministry of Defense. Last year LPA publicized a message from Defense Minister Grechko, but it was not mentioned by Soviet media.

Vietnamese communist media report scattered actions throughout the South and continue to review activities in various regions during January. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 13th, summarized by VNA, hails the "liberation home-guards" of Saigon for carrying out a "surprise attack" on 30 January against the Rex cinema-U.S. officers' billet building in downtown Saigon. One hundred U.S. officers are said to have been killed or injured in the attack. The paper says this proves that there is no sanctuary for the allies in Vietnam and that the liberation forces are wholly supported by the people.

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\* Tho has signed messages since then, including the usual Christmas and New Year's greetings to the American people, publicized by LPA on 23 December, and most recently a birthday greeting to Podgorny, reported by LPA on 17 February.

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One of Peking's sporadic items of the fighting in the South appears on 16 February when NCNA summarizes a 4 February LPA article on attacks on allied communication lines during January. The last previous mention of military action was NCNA's 7 January summary of the PLAF 17th special communique which reviewed 1969 "victories."

An article by VWP First Secretary Le Duan is reported by VNA on 14 February. The VNA account says that on the 14th the party organ NHAN DAN devotes "all its 12 pages" to the article, entitled "Under the Glorious Banner of the Party, for Independence and Freedom, for Socialism, Let Us March Toward New Victories." Hanoi radio begins to broadcast the text of the article on the 16th. The VNA account of the article indicates that it discusses a range of topics, including the development of the revolution, the building of socialism in the DRV, the party building task, and the "international conditions for the successes of the Vietnamese revolution." On the 15th, a NHAN DAN editorial characterizes Le Duan's article as a "very important and very basic document."

## PARIS TALKS: 12 FEBRUARY SESSION

**ALLIED SPEECHES** The VNA account of the Paris session on 12 February states that the U.S. and GVN delegates, who spoke first, "rehashed allegations." They claimed to be constructive and full of goodwill, VNA says, and thus were "heedless of the severe criticisms and complete refutation" by the DRV-PRG delegations and by progressive public opinion. "Acting head" of the U.S. delegation Philip Habib, according to VNA, "ballyhooed about free elections, withdrawal of outside forces, unpublicized restricted meetings, prisoner-of-war problems and so on and so forth." As for the GVN delegate, Pham Dang Lam "parroted about unpublicized restricted meetings, private meetings, and so on."

**COMMUNIST SPEECHES** Mme. Binh in her statement--which Liberation Radio carries in full on the 13th--developed arguments of the previous meeting in again addressing herself to the troop withdrawal question. She routinely denounced the United States for continuing to propose a mutual troop withdrawal and adhering to the three criteria for U.S. troop reductions, although the U.S. side "fully understands that the Vietnamese people will never accept" mutuality and conditions which "tread upon their independence and sovereignty." The more the war is "Vietnamized," she said, the more the Nixon Administration multiplies its "crimes against the Vietnamese people." She reiterated the standard calls for the unconditional, total, and rapid withdrawal of all American and allied forces from South Vietnam. And as she did last week, she repeated the PRG proposal

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for a U.S. troop withdrawal within a six-month period, saying that the PRG was prepared to act on it and asking: "Is the U.S. Government ready to do the same?"

In his debut at the sessions, Nguyen Minh Vy repeated the stock DRV positions and arguments. The VNA account notes that he criticized the United States for its "arrogant" attitude concerning settlement of the war. VNA also notes Vy's criticism of the Nixon Administration for refusing to give a serious answer to the proposal for direct talks with the PRG delegation and to the PRG's six-month U.S. troop withdrawal proposal. The account further notes his concluding remarks asking the United States to adopt a "more realistic" attitude to the Vietnam problem, forsake its "scheme of aggression" against Vietnam, and engage in "serious" discussions with the other parties at the talks so as to settle the conflict peacefully.

REBUTTALS        VNA reports the rebuttal remarks of the communist delegates in the usual fashion, giving no indication that the period was very brief. The VNA account merely says Mme. Binh and Nguyen Minh Vy in their supplementary remarks "vehemently criticized" and "laid bare" the "erroneous allegations" and "obdurate attitude" of the American and GVN delegates. Thus there is no reflection in the propaganda of the account given at the press briefing by PRG spokesman Ly Van Sau, who said that Mme. Binh found it unnecessary to make comments other than those in her prepared statement since the allied delegates "harped on" allegations that had been rejected many times, Sau also reported that DRV delegate Vy said merely: "I knew in advance what you would talk about and have consequently made sufficient criticism in my statement today. I do not see that many more comments are needed."

### HANOI ON LAIRD REMARKS ON RECONNAISSANCE OF DRV

NHAN DAN on 17 February, as reviewed by VNA, scores Defense Secretary Laird's statement at a 13 February news conference in Saigon "on the so-called policy of protective reaction regarding U.S. pilots flying over the DRV." The paper says that although Laird did not directly answer a question on the right of U.S. pilots to fire first, he "intimated" that pilots have the right to make preemptive air strikes in line with the policy of protective reaction. The article says this "clearly exposes the war intention" of the Nixon Administration and means that the United States "would send its pilots to bomb and strafe populated areas in North Vietnam then claim that they meet with danger." In the same connection, the article rejects the idea that reconnaissance flights constitute a self-defense measure and that "it is for self-defense these planes would bomb and open fire when fired upon."

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NHAN DAN decries the notion that there was an agreement between the DRV and the United States at the time of the 31 October 1968 bombing halt. Saying "it is necessary to refute the arrogant allegations of U.S. Secretary of Defense in their entirety," it adds that the DRV has on many occasions clearly stated that U.S. bombing of North Vietnam is illegal and must be ceased. Rejecting U.S. "demands" for reciprocity, the article says that the Nixon Administration's "claim about a supposed understanding is a mere distortion of truth aimed at pleading for the U.S. acts of provocation."

Hanoi radio on the 13th similarly scores Secretary Laird for "shamelessly" saying at a press conference in Saigon on the 11th that U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV are part of the understanding with Hanoi. The radio says it should be recalled that since the beginning of 1969, President Nixon has on several occasions made reference to this claim "without being able to deceive public opinion." It adds that the DRV, at the Paris talks, has "time and again pointed out that this is a deceptive maneuver" of the United States.

### MOSCOW ON LAIRD TRIP AND VIETNAMIZATION

Continued Soviet criticism of Vietnamization focuses on Secretary Laird's comments on the subject in Saigon. Commentators say Laird has prepared an "optimistic" account of the progress of the program to calm antiwar critics at home, but they present his 11 and 13 February remarks in Saigon in such a way as to imply U.S. reluctance to withdraw troops.

Unlike Hanoi's reports of Laird's 13 February press conference, Moscow's accounts ignore his comments on the air action over the DRV, TASS on the 17th does briefly report the NHAN DAN article which--in TASS' words--"exposed the falseness of the plea for self defense" which the Secretary used in that press conference to "justify the bombings." The TASS item does not, however, report that NHAN DAN scored the notion of an agreement between the DRV and the United States at the time of the bombing halt.

Referring to Secretary Laird's press conference of the 11th, TASS on the 12th merely says that he reaffirmed, as part of U.S. "strategy," that the United States intended to continue flights of reconnaissance and other military aircraft over the DRV. On the 16th, a TASS report of Laird's return home says the American public became "alarmed" over his statements in Saigon in which he "sanctioned" flights of American warplanes over DRV territory.

Some of the Soviet comment notes in passing that the Secretary said on the 11th that the United States would continue to "react defensively" with regard to Laotian and Cambodian territory, interpreting this as presaging intensified U.S. "aggression" against these countries.

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Highlighting the Secretary's comments on Vietnamization, Soviet accounts of his 11 February press conference note that he said U.S. combat units would remain in South Vietnam to protect support troops even after the GVN had taken over the bulk of the fighting. Moscow ignores his statement that there would be no pause in American withdrawal when the U.S. force level reaches 250,000 and his remark that the idea of maintaining a force that size was Secretary Clifford's. Commentators distort Laird's statement that he had opposed making public a timetable for troop withdrawal. TASS on the 11th describes Laird as "lashing out at the demand of the Democratic Party Policy Council" for complete troop withdrawal within 18 months, saying "that he intended to use all the means at his disposal to prevent this course of events" and stressing that he "did not intend to establish a definite schedule" for troop withdrawal. A 15 February PRAVDA international review by Yuriy Zhukov contains a similar description of Laird's remarks. A foreign-language radio broadcast on the 12th and a 13 February PRAVDA article make much the same point, but without mentioning the Democratic Party Policy Council. (Moscow continues to publicize remarks by war critics. For example, on the 13th TASS reports former Secretary Clifford's statement urging withdrawal of all combat troops by the end of the year and all other troops by the end of 1971.)

### SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN IN HANOI

A Soviet Foreign Ministry delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin arrived in Hanoi on 13 February, according to VNA on the next day, for a visit at the invitation of the DRV Foreign Ministry. The Bombay PTI had reported on the 13th that Firyubin passed through Calcutta on his way to Hanoi. The first available Soviet reports of his arrival in Hanoi came in broadcasts on the 16th.

Kosygin visited Hanoi in February 1965 and again in September 1969 for Ho Chi Minh's funeral, and Shelepin went to the DRV in January 1966. In May 1969 the chief of the Southeast Asia Division of the Foreign Ministry, Kapitsa--in a trip that was never publicized by communist media--visited Laos and Cambodia but is not known to have gone to Vietnam.

### "PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES" ANNIVERSARY

THE FRONT      The meeting in a "liberated area" in the South to mark the PLAF anniversary was held on 12 February according to a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 15th, and was addressed by PRG President Phat and PLAF deputy commander Mme. Dinh. Last year's meeting had been addressed by PLAF commander Tran Nam Trung, now PRG Defense Minister, and by the PLAF's "political commissar." There was

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also a PLAF command order last year as well as a letter from the NFLSV Presidium. No meetings were reported in 1968 or 1967; in 1966 Mme. Dinh delivered the opening speech and NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho read a Presidium letter.

Mme. Dinh's speech this year reviews the history of the PLAF, hailing the "correct" NFLSV and PRG political and military line, the accurate assessment of the balance of forces, and the application of "fundamental revolutionary principles." Other Front propaganda includes LPA's publication on the 9th of a series of accounts of exploits by various units and individuals. A PLAF Commentator article, publicized by LPA on the 13th, discusses the PLAF's growth and exploits and claims that in nine years it has put out of action 2,380,806 allied troops, including 775,457 U.S. troops, and destroyed 20,500 planes and 49,970 armored vehicles.

The Commentator article quotes the section from the NFLSV's political program on the army and praises the Front for guiding the PLAF. And a four-installment Liberation Radio commentary--broadcast from 12 through 15 February--reviews the development of the military "under the NFLSV banner." The victories of the past years are attributed to the Front's correct revolutionary and war line as well as to the army's military art. Commentator claims that the development of the military art originates from the Front's political line, military line, and leadership and from the people's democratic regime. The article describes the military art as based on continuous offense closely associated with political struggle and proselyting. It goes on to discuss feats of guerrilla warfare and of "concentrated combat," as well as "new combat methods and tactical tricks" to make it impossible for the allies to develop their "strong points and superiority" such as numerical strength, firepower, and mobility, "especially the mobility of helicopters."

HANOI The PLAF anniversary was marked in Hanoi by a meeting on the 13th sponsored by the Fatherland Front, the PRG mission, and the Defense Ministry. Speakers were General Chu Van Tan, central committee member of the VWP and the Fatherland Front; PRG representative Nguyen Van Tien; and General Ta Xuan Thu "of the VPA." Like editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the same day, the speeches routinely hailed "victories" and PLAF development, with NHAN DAN also applauding the NFLSV's leadership of the PLAF. The party paper says the history of the PLAF demonstrates the "correct political and military line" of the Front, a line which "creatively combines the national and democratic tasks" and is coupled with an appropriate revolutionary method. The editorial quotes Le Duan, on the occasion of the VWP anniversary, as recalling Ho Chi Minh's appeal to the people to continue fighting until complete victory.

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PEKING        The Chinese marked the anniversary with the usual message from Lin Piao, a 15 February meeting at the Chinese Defense Ministry, and a banquet on the 14th at the PRG mission in Peking. The PRG ambassador also gave a film reception on the 10th. As was the case last year, there are no PEOPLE'S DAILY or LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorials.

Lin Piao uses the "lips and teeth" analogy in asserting China's support for Vietnam in his message, and he declares that the PLA will always stand by the Vietnamese and support them to the end. According to NCNA, the PRG ambassador quoted this pledge in his speech at the PRC Defense Ministry meeting. The speeches at the observances contain typical praise for Vietnamese victories, assertions that the Vietnamese will persist in "protracted war" until final victory, and claims of Chinese support for the Vietnamese.

In his greetings message, Lin Piao scores the "Nixon government" for pushing its "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" of Vietnamizing the war and at the same time "chanting 'peace' and playing the trick of 'withdrawal of troops'" in order to deceive world opinion and perpetuate its occupation of the South and the division of the Vietnamese nation. The PRG ambassador, in his speech at the banquet on the 14th, similarly asserts that although the United States speaks of peace it is intensifying the war and trying to hoodwink the people with Vietnamization.

MOSCOW        The Soviet Union observed the anniversary, as it did last year, with articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR and with a Moscow meeting, reported on the 13th. The meeting was addressed this year by Army General Batov, vice chairman of the Soviet Committee in Support of Vietnam. On 17 February the domestic service reports that the PRG ambassador gave a reception that day. There is no available report of a greetings message from Defense Minister Grechko; last year such a message was publicized by LPA but not by Moscow. The Moscow domestic service does report on the 13th that a message was sent by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Soviet Committee in Support of Vietnam.

Available Soviet comment on the anniversary reaffirms Soviet resolve to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. armed intervention and expresses support for the NFLSV/PRG program for a peaceful settlement, but makes no mention of the Paris talks.

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## ALLIED "CRIMES," PRESIDENT NIXON'S "USE OF POISONS"

On 11 February Hanoi publicizes a communique issued by the western Nam Bo NFLSV committee on 31 January denouncing recent allied "crimes" committed in the area in the course of B-52 bombings and chemical sprayings. Vietnamese communist media continue to report on alleged allied crimes in Quang Nam Province in November 1969, with Hanoi saying in a 16 February broadcast that the Front's central Trung Bo crimes committee has made public further details of crimes that occurred during a Korean-South Vietnamese operation.

An LPA article by Hue Alliance leader Le Van Hao, reported by Hanoi radio on the 14th, again takes up the issue of the massacres committed during the communist occupation of Hue in the 1968 Tet offensive. Hao accuses the allies of committing "grave" crimes at that time in shelling and bombing the city, and he recalls the February 1968 letter he addressed to world leaders on the subject. He says that to massacre a large number of people is an "unpardonable" crime, but to exhume the bones and remains of those killed by allied forces in order to "falsely accuse the patriots is an extremely abominable crime." He does not acknowledge, as communist media have done on occasion, that the "liberation" occupation forces in Hue eliminated "cruel agents." On 2 February an LPA report had similarly charged the allies with falsely accusing the communists of mass murders in Hue so as to cover up their own crimes.

"USE OF POISONS" A Liberation Radio commentary on 17 February, charging the United States with using CW in Vietnam, virulently attacks President Nixon as a "devil" whose "mouth is spurring chemicals to kill people." While "babbling" about the treatment of captured U.S. airmen, the commentary says, the President and his Administration have disregarded the 1925 Geneva Convention prohibiting use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and have committed "extremely savage crimes," far exceeding those of "any archaggressors preceding him," against South Vietnam. By "barbarously and intensively" using toxic chemicals to "kill our compatriots," the commentary says, Mr. Nixon has further exposed his "hypocritical and false-peace face." It adds that former Vice President Humphrey also "raised his voice to denounce Nixon for trampling on the 1925 Geneva Convention."

## SAIGON-GIA DINH AREA SECOND MILITARY CONGRESS

Liberation Radio reports on the 12th that a second congress of northern Saigon-Gia Dinh area combatants was held at an undisclosed time in a "liberated area" bordering Saigon. The report does not define the extent of this area--referred to as a "military zone"--but notes that the four-day

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meeting was attended by more than 150 delegates, some representing Cu Chi, Go Vap, Ben Cat, Dau Tieng, and Trung Bung districts. This area's first congress was held in early 1969 and drew 170 delegates, according to a Front broadcast on 23 February 1969.

A speech by the area's PLAF "comrade commander" is said to have opened the second congress, followed by a report delivered by the area "comrade political commissar." The political commissar's report claims that more than 30,000 allied troops, including 16,500 Americans, were put out of action in the area from January to June 1969 and that the "victories" have contributed to initial defeat of the allied pacification and Vietnamization programs. The commissar is also reported to have informed the area congress that the war is not yet ended and that "we must not nurture any illusions and be subjective," since the revolutionary path ahead "is full of obstacles" presented by a "stubborn enemy."

### DRV RESOLUTION ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Reports that the DRV Council of Ministers "recently" issued a resolution on the labor productivity movement are carried by Hanoi radio on the 12th and VNA on the 13th. The resolution is cited in a NHAN DAN editorial broadcast on the 13th by Hanoi radio, which also recalls that Le Duan, in his speech on the occasion of the party's 40th anniversary, emphasized the importance of developing the labor force and output.

The radio account of the resolution says the requirements for the "anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking," socialist construction, and satisfactory implementation of the 1970 state plan make it necessary "to develop urgently and completely all our latent potentialities"--especially the people's capabilities and labor strength--and "to change the entire people's revolutionary movement to emulate in productive labor" and overfulfill the state plan. The Council of Ministers cited these reasons for its decision to launch a movement to mobilize all productive labor forces "to participate positively in productive labor and work and to increase social labor output."

The broadcast notes that the Council of Ministers had pointed out the "essential requirements" of the drive, such as working with high efficiency, heightening workers' socialist awareness and labor viewpoint, and increasing the party's leadership power. The Council also set forth as "essential measures" to insure realization of the drive the strengthening and improving of economic organization and management tasks, strengthening of market management, educational, political and ideological tasks, and heightening of the role and managerial power of administrative organizations.

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## CAMBODIA

## PHAM VAN DONG VISIT APPARENTLY SET FOR NEAR FUTURE

Current propaganda indicates that Pham Van Dong may be preparing to visit Cambodia soon, after Sihanouk's return home from medical treatment in France. On 13 February VNA carries an undated exchange of messages between Dong and Sihanouk which had been summarized briefly by Phnom Penh on the 9th. The DRV Premier expresses hope that a visit may take place "in the near future." Sihanouk in turn says Cambodia is preparing a "warm reception" for Dong, adding: "I will be in Phnom Penh at the Pochentong Airport to welcome Your Excellency after the medical treatment that has taken me to a foreign country."

The projected visit was first mentioned in monitored propaganda on 17 September when VNA reported a message, dated the 14th, in which Sihanouk thanked Pham Van Dong for his hospitality in Hanoi during Ho's funeral and alluded briefly to Dong's "coming state visit to our country." On 21 September VNA reported Pham Van Dong's reply, dated the 18th, thanking Sihanouk for "the honor you reserved for me of a coming state visit."

## LAOS

## "AGGRESSION," NEUTRALIZATION PLAN SCORED BY PATHET LAO, DRV

**PATHET LAO** Further authoritative attacks on "intensified" U.S. aggression in Laos follow the NLHX rejection of Souvanna Phouma's proposal for neutralization of the Plain of Jars. The proposal itself again comes under attack in an NLHX Central Committee spokesman's "communique" dated 14 February and carried by the Pathet Lao Radio on the 17th.\* The communique says the Americans have suffered defeats in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang region and therefore "ordered" Souvanna Phouma to submit his neutralization proposal and began evacuating the people from the Plain of Jars. The evacuation, it says, is an effort to "isolate" the Plain and thus "contradicts" Souvanna's proposal. Scoring the "illegal" U.S. acts and the "violation" of the Geneva agreement, the communique stresses the right of the patriotic forces to liberate the people from imperialism.

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\* The neutralization proposal has not been acknowledged in available Moscow propaganda, but Peking's NCNA noted the proposal in reporting the initial 5 February NLHX rejection.

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Two NLHX statements on 9 February attacking U.S. aggression do not mention the neutralization proposal, however. An NLHX Central Committee statement, dated the 9th and carried by Pathet Lao radio on the 11th, denounces the first year of the Nixon Administration as one of "exorbitant" U.S. attempts to intensify aggression in Laos and commit "unprecedentedly hideous" crimes against the people. It reviews charges of increased air force activities and the use of "5,000 Thai bandit troops" and "12,000 U.S. green berets," and it accuses the Administration of "noisily slandering and vilifying the NLHX and DRV" in an effort to deceive public opinion. The NLHX statement recalls that "peace- and justice-loving peoples and governments of the world, particularly the Soviet Government in its capacity as cochairman of the Geneva conference," have issued statements condemning the U.S. acts in Laos. And it appeals to the countries, "particularly countries signatory to the 1961-62 Geneva agreements, such as the conference cochairmen," to compel the Nixon Administration to implement the Geneva agreement and let the Laotian people solve their own affairs on that basis and in conformity with the "reality of the present situation" in Laos.\* A 9 February NLHX Central Committee spokesman's "communiqué," broadcast on the 12th, condemns "crimes" committed by the U.S., Thai, and Vang Pao forces in the recent operations "launched in hopes of seizing the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang liberated areas."

HANOI A "new victory" of the Laotian patriots fighting in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang region is hailed by Hanoi in a NHAU DAN article carried by VNA on the 16th. It says once again that the region "lies in the zone controlled by the NLHX and the Patriotic Neutralist Forces," and it again derides Souvanna Phouma's neutralization proposal as an effort to "legalize" U.S.-puppet occupation of the zone. Further criticism of the neutralization proposal is aired by VNA in a 13 February account of a Hanoi press conference held by the director of the NLHX Information Bureau to publicize the 5 February NLHX Central Committee spokesman's statement.

On 17 February VNA "categorically refutes" a 14 February press conference held in Vientiane to present North Vietnamese prisoners and ralliers, calling it a "calumny" to mask U.S. aggression. Hanoi has in the past occasionally used the vehicle of VNA "authorized denials" to rebut allegations that there are VPA troops and prisoners in Laos, although it has not done so for over a year. The last such denial was issued on 3 December 1968.

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\* NCNA reports the two NLHX statements of 9 February, but in noting that the NLHX Central Committee statement decried U.S. "sabotage" of the Geneva agreements and "warned" the United States to stop its aggression, NCNA ignores the references to the Soviet Union and the Geneva conference cochairmen.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR PUBLICIZES KOSYGIN "APPEAL," CONDEMNS ABU ZABAL RAID

On 12 February Moscow reveals for the first time the existence of Kosygin's late January and early February notes to the United States, Britain, and France, describing these "peace appeals" as an "important Soviet Government initiative." President Nixon's reply is characterized as unconstructive, an "encouragement to the aggressor," and the British response is written off as agreeing in the main with the President. The French reply gets no individual attention.

Glossing over details of the Israeli "deep raids" against OAR military targets, Soviet propaganda continues to assert that these attacks are designed by Israel and "imperialism" to intimidate the Egyptians and eliminate "progressive" Arab regimes, but that the operations are having the opposite effect. Moscow predictably seized on the 12 February Israeli attack on an Egyptian plant at Abu Zabal, the propaganda outcry culminating in a TASS statement on the 16th. Declaring that the raid was carried out with U.S. Phantom aircraft, commentators say the attack on a civilian target exposes the real U.S. attitude toward the Middle East. A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 13th says, for example, that the United States has more effective means of stopping Israel's "aggression" than "hypocritical expressions of regret": It need only halt its military aid to Tel Aviv.

KOSYGIN        The report on the "important initiative of the Soviet  
LETTERS        Government" belatedly publicizes the existence--but not  
              the date or the text--of Kosygin's 31 January note to the  
United States and the notes delivered on 2 February to Britain and  
France, giving only a general indication of their content. TASS on  
the 12th carried the report, as published in the central press on the  
13th, followed minutes later by a shorter version omitting some  
passages and transposing one paragraph. The "report"--so described  
in TASS' press review on the 13th--appeared on the front pages of all  
the central newspapers except PRAVDA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and RURAL  
LIFE. PRAVDA published it on page four with foreign news. The report  
has been widely broadcast as well as quoted in ensuing propaganda,  
which plays up "extensive" foreign press reaction to both the Kosygin  
"appeals" and the 16 February TASS statement.

The TASS report says Kosygin's "personal messages" called attention to  
the consequences of Israel's course and affirmed the impossibility of  
the Arab states' accepting the seizure of their land. The Israeli  
Government, the report says, should be warned against adventurism.  
It advocates "urgent and firm steps" to prompt Israel "to heed the

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voice of reason." In this regard, the report says it is particularly necessary to effectively use consultations between powers, including the four-power talks. There is the customary emphasis on Soviet desire for a political settlement based on "interconnected fulfillment" of all provisions of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and the customary insistence on the necessity of Israeli withdrawal.

The report includes no reference to "support and assistance" to the Arabs; it does say the Soviet Union is "fully resolved to help foil imperialist ventures" in the Middle East, and "there should be no doubt about that"--a phrase repeated in subsequent comment. A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 13th makes clear the intent of the Soviet "resolve" when it uses this phrase immediately after stressing Soviet support and help to the Arabs.

Noting that replies to the "Soviet appeal" have been received, the report charges the U.S. Government with "openly taking Israeli ruling circles under its protection," equating the aggressor and his victims, "vigorously" opposing the Arab liberation struggle, and "threatening to increase its arms shipments."

Zhukov in PRAVDA on the 15th alludes to the issue of arms limitation, remarking on U.S. "attempts to achieve a limitation, if not a total cessation, of assistance to victims of this aggression." And a panelist in the 15 February Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable touches on the subject, asserting that the "true meaning" of the U.S. position cannot be camouflaged by "demagogic statements about a speedy restoration of the cease-fire, about limiting arms supplies to the region, and so forth." Moscow has been virtually silent on the question of reinstituting the cease-fire: Belyayev in PRAVDA on the 14th refers to the cease-fire only in denouncing the Abu Zabal incident as a "flagrant violation" of the Security Council's cease-fire resolution. TASS on the 12th, in a short account of the UAR Government spokesman's press conference, ignores his argument that the June 1967 cease-fire resolution and the November 1967 Security Council resolution cannot be considered separately; it reports him merely as pointing out that Israel refuses to comply with the November resolution, which the UAR accepted.

**TASS STATEMENT** The TASS statement on 16 February gives impetus to the propaganda denunciation of the 12 February Israeli attack on Egyptian metal works at Abu Zabal, accusing Israel of "resorting to any atrocities" in its desire to thwart a peaceful political settlement. The last TASS statement on the Middle East, on 29 October, had dealt with the Lebanese crisis. Earlier, a TASS statement on 29 August was pegged to the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem; a statement on 27 February last year dealt with a "series of new aggressive acts" by Israel, as did a statement on 6 November 1968

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in the wake of the Israeli raid on the Naj-Hammadi power plant in the UAR. (The 1968 statement included a variation of the standard warning that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to events in the region of its frontiers; versions of the formula have recurred from time to time since the June 1967 war, but have been absent from the propaganda since last fall.)

The current statement does not name the United States, confining itself to accusations that the "Israeli militarists and those who put weapons in their hands" appear confident that by "blackmail, threats," and escalation of the "aggression" they will make the Arab states renounce their lawful interests. TASS reiterates that the Soviet policy is aimed at establishing peace in the area, "and our country will not weaken its efforts in this direction." It adds a pledge of "necessary support" to help the Arab states strengthen "their ability to uphold their security and just interests," but with the qualifier that support will be proffered "as long as" the "aggressor" ignores the principles and goals of the UN Charter and UN decisions on the Middle East. A NEW TIMES editorial reported by TASS on the 11th similarly says that "as long as Israel clings to its adventurist course and the United States fails to see" that it is time to make Israel reckon with the UN will, the Soviet Union will give all-round support to the Arab struggle.

INTERVIEW Briefly reporting the recent interview with Nasir by  
WITH NASIR James Reston of the New York TIMES, Moscow's domestic service on the 16th takes note only of Nasir's remarks on the November 1967 Security Council resolution and on the U.S. plan for a settlement entailing direct Arab-Israeli talks. The UAR President had acknowledged in the interview that he had tried to obtain MIG-23's from the Russians two months ago; he told Reston he would "have to think about" the "delicate question" when asked if he were prepared to accept direct air support from the Soviet Union or fliers from other countries. A RED STAR article on 14 January takes the line that the Israeli military command "acknowledges the increasing skill of Egyptian pilots and commandos," and it attributes to "observers in the Middle East" the view that "in the near future the role of the Egyptian air force will change radically."

OTHER MEDIA Peking, continuing to portray Arab enthusiasm for Chou En-lai's 2 February message of support to Nasir, publicizes the UAR leader's reply on 17 February. NCNA on the 14th assailed the State Department's statement on the Abu Zabal raid as "hypocrisy and shamelessness" in again "peddling the 'cease-fire resolutions'" which were "jointly concocted by U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism" to coerce the Arab countries into accepting the fait accompli brought about by the June 1967 war.

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A DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 15 February expressed indignation at the Abu Zabal attack. Earlier, the North Korean Government, in a statement issued on 4 February, had "vehemently denounced" intensified "aggression" by the "Zionists, directly instigated by U.S. imperialism."

Condemnations of the Abu Zabal incident have been made by the East Europeans in the form of statements by GDR and Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesmen and by the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. Both the Polish and GDR foreign ministers, receiving Arab ambassadors who were presenting the communique of the recent Cairo "frontline" states' conference, censured the Israeli action. Bucharest's SCINTEIA expresses disapproval, calling the Abu Zabal bombing a violation of the Security Council cease-fire resolution and urging application of the November 1967 resolution. Tito, according to TANYUG, cabled his "indignation" to Nasir.

#### NEW TIMES CONTRASTS SOVIET, AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON MIDEAST

A Laptev article in the 5 February NEW TIMES goes into unusual detail in comparing the U.S. and Soviet proposals for a settlement. This is the first such lengthy discussion of the Soviet proposals since they were identified and outlined in the 27 January Maksimov article in PRAVDA. Laptev argues that the participants in the conflict must reach agreement on the "main questions" specified in the November Security Council resolution. But the American proposals, he says, devote "disproportionately great attention" to the procedure and forms of Arab-Israeli contacts. Given agreement on the main questions, he maintains, it would be possible to "find a procedure" for concluding an acceptable agreement. He goes on to stress the Soviet view that solution of other problems is impossible without unconditional Israeli withdrawal, the "key question."

On the subject of borders, Laptev says the USSR proposes that the lines existing on 5 June 1967 "be fixed as the permanent and recognized borders." He adds that the Arab countries agree with this proposal, "although such a decision means a considerable concession" to Israel in that the 5 June 1967 lines "are more favorable to Israel than the borders fixed in 1947 by the UN decision creating the Israeli state." Soviet propaganda has been ambiguous on this point, calling for withdrawal to the pre-5 June lines but failing to define them as the permanent frontiers, and occasionally seeming to suggest consideration of the 1947 boundaries.

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## CYPRUS

## TASS STATEMENT ACCUSES NATIONAL FRONT, NATO OF PRO-ENOSIS PLOT

The controversy in Cyprus over the terrorist activities of the rightwing, pro-enosis National Front has prompted increased Soviet propaganda attention to Cyprus in recent weeks, culminating in a TASS statement of 17 February. TASS repeats the stereotyped Soviet charges that NATO is trying to foster Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot differences in an effort to intervene, strip Cyprus of its independence, and turn the island into a "military springboard" in the Eastern Mediterranean. The National Front and "other reactionary forces" in league with the Greek regime are "in the service" of NATO, propagandizing enosis--union with Greece--to achieve these ends, TASS says. The statement accuses "NATO agents" of trying to frustrate the intercommunal talks, which Moscow has regarded approvingly. It describes the increased "antistate activities" as part of a "general plan of 'settlement'" of the Cyprus question by military means long fostered in NATO circles.

The statement charges that "the conspirators are trying to fan malicious anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda," distorting Soviet foreign policy. It calls the foreign military bases and the troops stationed on the island a source of constant tension, and it claims "there are no doubts as to the dangerous role" assigned to "reactionary Greek officers" who continue to hold important positions in the Cyprus armed forces.\*

TASS points to the "consistent" and "well-known" Soviet stand of support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus, liquidation of foreign military bases, and a peaceful settlement without foreign interference. Stating that the Soviet Union "is keeping a close eye on the current development of events" in and around Cyprus, the statement concludes with a call for an end to "subversive activities" against the Cypriot state and for "restraint and wisdom."

The last previous TASS statement on Cyprus, on 4 July 1967, had also pictured the Republic of Cyprus as endangered by plots concocted in Greece and supported by "aggressive NATO circles," aimed at turning the island into a NATO place d'armes. The 1967 statement followed periodic propaganda charges of intrigues against Cyprus in the aftermath of the Greek coup that spring. TASS on 10 July 1967 issued a brief denial of

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\* Nicosia radio on the 18th reports a government spokesman as declaring that the Cyprus Government does not share the TASS statement's view that Greek officers are involved in actions directed against Cyprus. The spokesman added that there is "complete unanimity of views" between the Greek and Cypriot governments concerning the handling and final settlement of the Cyprus issue.

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Western press reports on a Soviet-Cypriot agreement on the sale of arms to Cyprus. The last formal Soviet statement on Cyprus was a Soviet Government statement in November 1967 prompted by the tense Cypriot-Turkish relations.

Prior to the current TASS statement, PRAVDA's writer on Cypriot and Greek affairs, Bragin, had dealt in several articles with the "serious situation" resulting from the National Front's "subversive activity," citing assessments by President Makarios, House president Kliridhis, and AKEL, the Cypriot communist party. In a 30 January article he charged that Athens officers occupying command positions in the Cypriot National Guard were playing an "extremely challenging and provocative role"; operating under directives of the Greek military junta, he said, they were waging an "unbridled campaign" against the "progressive forces" and the Cyprus Government. According to Cyprus press reports, Bragin added, they were "slanderosly attacking" Makarios and "threatening an Athens-style military putsch." The terrorists, Bragin said, took these activities as instruction for action and exploded a bomb at the presidential palace as well as at the house of AKEL General Secretary Prapaioannou.

Bragin said the Cypriots were demanding that the government adopt more resolute measures to deal with the "criminal bands." A commentary broadcast to Cyprus in Greek on 2 February and in Turkish on the 4th had welcomed approval of the preventive detention law by the House of Representatives the week before as a "most important event" in the life of the republic. The new law, ratified in response to the terrorist activities, was viewed as of "great significance" for maintaining order and safeguarding the country's security.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW DENIES HOSTILE INTENT; TREATY ANNIVERSARY IGNORED

As the 14 February anniversary--the 20th--of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance passed without notice by either side for the fourth successive year, PRAVDA on the 15th carried an article by an original member of the Soviet negotiating team at the Peking talks denouncing Western speculation over a possible Soviet attack on China and reaffirming Moscow's peaceful intentions. The PRAVDA article, by Soviet sinologist S. Tikhvinskiy, represents the most candid expression of Moscow's concern over opportunities accruing to the United States to acquire leverage and maneuverability in the triangular power relationship as a result of Sino-Soviet tensions. The article interprets works such as Harrison Salisbury's recent book on a possible Sino-Soviet war as being an appeal to Washington to normalize relations with the PRC while also being addressed to anti-Soviet elements in Peking which may be receptive to U.S. overtures.

On the date of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary the Moscow press carried a TASS report on a meeting of activists of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society who reminisced about Soviet missionary work during "Soviet-Chinese cooperation in various stages of the Chinese revolution." While noting that speakers at the Moscow meeting stressed "the great significance of the friendship" between the two peoples, the report does not mention the treaty.

Though the Tikhvinskiy article refers in general terms to Soviet efforts to normalize state relations with the PRC and to Chinese territorial claims, it does not mention the Peking talks, and PRAVDA does not identify Tikhvinskiy's association with the Soviet delegation. In what may have been another of the leaks coming from each side, Soviet journalist Victor Louis, writing in the London EVENING NEWS on 11 February, referred to new tension on the border and suggested that chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov may soon be recalled. An 18 February article in the Polish paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY, devoted mainly to the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, observes that no progress has been reported in the Sino-Soviet talks after four months, and it adds that this must be kept in mind when assessing the Warsaw talks. A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 12th mentioned the Peking talks in citing a Hungarian paper as noting that the Chinese had temporarily suspended their anti-Soviet polemics at the time the talks opened but had subsequently resumed them.

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\* TASS transmitted the report on the evening of the 13th, with a dateline of 14 February and an embargo for release at midnight.

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Peking has initiated no new attacks on the Soviets since its 9 February denunciation of Moscow's dealings with Bonn. Another attack on the Soviet leadership did appear, however, in a 17 February NCNA summary of an article in the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT assailing "the Soviet Brezhnev-Kosygin renegade clique."\* The PRC's observances over the weekend of the anniversary of the South Vietnamese PLAF failed to attack the Soviets.

#### HISTORICAL REVIEWS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Couched in terms of a denunciation of Harrison Salisbury's "War Between Russia and China" as an attempt to prevent the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the Tikhvinskiy PRAVDA article provides a historical review of Soviet relations with China in an effort to counter a picture of "age-old and irreconcilable" antagonism between the two giants on the Eurasian land mass. In rebuttal Tikhvinskiy portrays an unceasing Soviet struggle "to deliver China from the yoke of the imperialist powers," pointing to Soviet renunciation of "all unequal agreements and treaties at one time imposed on China by tsarism" and of "all the concessions, rights, and privileges obtained by the Russian bourgeoisie and bureaucracy."

Using the attack on Salisbury's book to present Moscow's position on the border dispute, Tikhvinskiy accuses Salisbury of falsifying the history of the border question, repeating "the slanderous fabrications of Chinese nationalist propaganda on the supposed 'exploitation' of China by the Soviet Union, on certain 'territorial seizures' by the USSR in China, and on mythical Soviet claims to Chinese lands," and concurrently defending the "chauvinist, hegemonist policy of the Chinese nationalists' territorial claims on the Soviet Union and the MPR." This sort of language has been absent from Soviet comment since agreement was reached to hold talks with the Chinese.

Apart from these remarks on the border dispute, Tikhvinskiy ignores the past decade of Sino-Soviet relations. Accentuating the positive, he echoes themes struck in recent installments of a continuing Radio Moscow series in Mandarin, "Glorious Chapters in the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations," when he recalls the decisive assistance rendered to the Chinese by the Soviets in defeating the Japanese during World War II and in liberating large areas of China. Tikhvinskiy reminisces about the "holiday of friendship" which celebrated the arrival of the Soviet army in Port Arthur in 1945.

The 14 February installment in the historical series in Mandarin, while skirting the Sino-Soviet treaty signed on that date 20 years earlier, emphasized Soviet assistance to the development of Manchuria, including

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\* Tirana customarily names both Brezhnev and Kosygin in its attacks on the Kremlin leadership, whereas in Peking's formulations only Brezhnev is named.

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construction of the Dairen shipyard and the Port Arthur naval base. It characterized the handing over of the Port Arthur base to the PRC under a 1954 agreement as "the greatest contribution" of the Soviet Union to the Chinese army. Also on 14 February, Radio Moscow's program in Mandarin for PLA listeners quoted three former Soviet military advisers to China calling attention to the Soviet liberation of northeast China and to the extensive Soviet technical and material aid to the Chinese during the 1940's and 1950's. The advisers expressed regret at the PRC's current "ingratitude in slandering our country's tremendous material and spiritual assistance to the Chinese people and their armed forces."

**MOSCOW ON PRC LEADERSHIP** The Tikhvinskiy article, while making reproving reference to "nationalist" elements in Peking who may be inclined to play realpolitik with the West against Moscow, also seems implicitly aimed at bolstering the position of what the Soviets call "internationalist" elements in Peking--those favorable to an accommodation with Moscow. This appears to be the point of Tikhvinskiy's protestations of Moscow's peaceful intent and his rebuttal of those in the West attempting "to intimidate the Chinese leaders with the bugbear of a Soviet threat and to push the PRC into the arms of the United States."

Tikhvinskiy avoids mentioning Mao, but a 17 February TASS commentary repeatedly mentions Mao and the "Maoists" in picturing a "bitter struggle" for leadership within the CCP at a time of party reorganization. The Maoists, TASS says, fear that rehabilitation of party cadres might lead to the restoration of party organs which could "again question the leadership of the Great Helmsman and his deputy."

A 13 February commentary broadcast in English to Asia over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress represents the sharpest and most detailed portrayal of divisions at the top levels of the Chinese leadership to appear in Soviet media since the agreement to hold talks was announced. The broadcast pictures a "bitter struggle" over China's future economic course, with Mao Tse-tung pressing a "reckless big leap policy" in opposition to "the realistic course of regulation" of the economy "backed by Chou En-lai."\* Both antagonists, the broadcast says, "have groups of influential followers."

\* Chou has largely been spared in the virulent portraits of Mao and other members of the Peking hierarchy that have appeared in Soviet propaganda in recent years. On the positive side, he was favored with a highly unusual fraternal gesture from Moscow when Brezhnev called him "Comrade" in a speech on 27 October, a week after the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks. A watershed in Soviet relations with China was the 27 November 1966 Pravda editorial article which introduced the anathema formula "Mao Tse-tung and his group." A CPSU Central Committee resolution in August that year had referred to the policies of "Comrade Mao Tse-tung." A Central Committee resolution in December, however, omitted the fraternal title and referred to Mao and his group--a formulation that became standard in Soviet polemics.

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## PARTY UNITS OF CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT CONFER

Soviet radio and press reports indicate that the restructured political organs in the recently created Central Asian Military District near the Sinkiang border are beginning to function.\* The Alma Ata radio reported on 16 February that the first Komsomol Conference of the Central Asian Military District opened on that date and heard speeches by the secretaries of the Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Tadzhik Komsomol central committees. Reports of the inaugural meeting of the new district's party conference on 3 February had not mentioned a Tadzhik representative, noting only that reports were delivered by the secretaries of the Kirgiz and Kazakh central committees.

Marking the 3 February party meeting, an article in the 3 February issue of the Alma Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA by Major General K. A. Maksimov, chief of the district political directorate, emphasized the importance of increasing the district forces' combat readiness in order to defend the Soviet Union's borders. Citing the strength of the world communist movement, Maksimov warned that "no attempts by the Peking provocateurs will be able to undermine the unity and monolithic nature of the world communist movement."

## TASS CORRESPONDENTS REPORT MOCK NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK

A detailed description of a mock airborne nuclear missile strike against "the enemy"--unnamed--is contained in an article by two TASS correspondents carried in three major central Asian newspapers, Tashkent's PRAVDA VOSTOKA and Dushanbe's KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA on 11 February and Frunze's SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA on the 15th. Describing the thoughts and activities of the pilots of "modern combat vehicles equipped with the latest systems and with all manner of instruments," the article tells of avoiding contact with "the enemy" during the flight of "many hours" covering "many thousands of kilometers," of breaking through the air defense barriers and repelling the attacks of fighters and air defense missiles, of launching the nuclear missiles against a predetermined target, and of returning safely to home base. Nothing of this kind has appeared in Soviet central media.

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\* The 13 November 1969 issue of the TRENDS documents initial Soviet reports indicating that the old Turkestan Military District was divided into a new, reduced Turkestan Military District and a Central Asian Military District with apparent headquarters in Alma Ata.

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## SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

## PEKING CHARGES U.S. WITH POLICY OF HOSTILITY TOWARD PRC

The alleged downing of a U.S. drone over the Hainan Island area on 10 February has been followed by the most direct charges of U.S. hostility toward the PRC to appear in the stream of comment from Peking since the 20 January session of the Warsaw talks. Comment in the wake of the incident claims that the drone flight was "new evidence" that the Nixon Administration is "stubbornly pursuing the policy of hostility" toward the PRC. A similar note was struck in a 12 February NCNA report on the U.S. foreign aid bill signed into law two days earlier; in this case Peking took military aid for Taiwan as evidence of U.S. hostility.

Peking's propaganda on the alleged shootdown follows the lines taken after the previous reported incident, on 28 October last year: an original announcement on 11 February accompanied by a party Military Commission commendation of the unit said to be responsible (a naval air defense unit); a joint Commentator article in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY; and reports from the area of the incident playing up themes of vigilance and war preparedness. In one notable change, however, Commentator does not repeat a reference in last October's article to the Nixon Administration's "'talks' tricks," thereby reinforcing other signs in recent comment that Peking is studiously keeping the record open for the forthcoming Warsaw session. As in the case of the previous incident, Commentator derides the Administration's professed desire for peace but fails to mention specific issues.

An article in the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield" column of NCNA's domestic service on 11 February seems to raise some sensitive issues in the course of an attack on the President's announcement regarding U.S. policy on CBW. Charging that U.S. pledges not to be the first to use these weapons are a smokescreen for carrying out further research and development, the article quotes Stalin as observing that "diplomats of the bourgeoisie" appeal for peace and friendly relations when they are preparing for war. At another point, making the standard charge that the President is pursuing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics," the article states that "the revolutionary people of the world will neither believe the 'good words' of imperialism nor be frightened by its threat." A service message carried by NCNA an hour later instructed recipient stations to "temporarily hold" the article. The press is not yet available to determine whether the article was published; it was broadcast by Radio Peking in the domestic service and in Russian, but it has not been carried in NCNA's international service in English.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS

## MOSCOW CRITICIZES PRESIDENT THROUGH PROXY OF U.S. COLUMNIST

Soviet censure of the Administration's decision to extend the projected Safeguard system is sustained in a low volume of propaganda, drawing heavily on statements of the U.S. domestic opposition. Soviet commentators, speaking on their own authority, are not critical of President Nixon's personal role in the decision to extend the system. But IZVESTIYA on 13 February attacks the President through the proxy of an American commentator, publishing lengthy excerpts from a 3 February Washington POST article by columnist Joseph Kraft pegged to the decision on the second phase of Safeguard announced at the President's 30 January press conference. Where Soviet commentators habitually trace the decision to pressures from the "military-industrial complex," IZVESTIYA's version of the Kraft article relates the decision to "the fundamental foreign policy views" of the President and his adviser Henry Kissinger, concluding that the decision was "dictated by" the President's "own profound convictions."

IZVESTIYA's version of the Kraft article pictures the President as an inveterate foe of communism. The excerpts include the comment that more and more people "are now inclined to an assessment of Nixon and Kissinger which can hardly be described as good. This assessment starts from the historical fact that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have long been regarded as being among the convinced anticommunists who advocate a tough line." Kraft is further quoted as remarking that the President "in particular loves to flail his opponents for displaying excessive softness toward communists" and as adding that both the President and Kissinger are now trying to use the threat of a further buildup "of nuclear potential, and in particular the development of the ABM system, in order to force the Russians to meet them halfway" on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The article's conclusion, according to IZVESTIYA, is that serious-minded people are apprehensive lest the extension of Safeguard complicate SALT to such an extent "that it will not be possible to achieve even a limited agreement."

Kraft's article in the POST had examined at some length the U.S. rationale since 1967 for the development of an ABM system directed against China and the President's acceptance of the need for such a China-oriented system, but IZVESTIYA's excerpts mention China only once. The IZVESTIYA version says that President Nixon may in fact believe "a new and dangerous threat" has arisen from China, but that few U.S. officials share this view. Soviet media have acknowledged in the past that the U.S. ABM system has been developed

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In part as a defense against China, but Moscow has not aired this notion widely and has portrayed the system as oriented in the main against the USSR.

Like the comments quoted from Kraft, a foreign-language talk by Shakhov over Radio Moscow on the 16th brings up the thesis that the decision to extend Safeguard is aimed in part at strengthening the U.S. bargaining position in the second round of SALT in mid-April. Shakhov says American observers see the decision as stemming from "a desire to impose conditions on the USSR during the talks. In other words, . . . Washington is tenaciously clinging to the policy of force."

Other Soviet propaganda highlights Congressional concern over the possible impact of ABM deployment on SALT. On 8 February, for example, an international review by Mikhaylov in PRAVDA noted Senator Mansfield's "fear" that the Administration's decision could threaten SALT. And TASS reported on the 5th that Senators Fulbright, Case, and Symington had warned of the "negative influence" the ABM decision might have on the talks.

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## GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS

## USSR URGES TREATIES ON CB WEAPONS, USE OF SEABED

Moscow media welcome the reconvening on 17 February of the 26-nation Geneva disarmament conference--in recess since 30 October--in a low volume of propaganda calling routinely for the conclusion of treaties outlawing chemical and bacteriological weapons and prohibiting the placing of mass-destruction weapons on the seabed. Chief Soviet delegate Roshchin in his opening remarks called these issues the "most important problems" facing the conferees, and an IZVESTIYA article reviewed by TASS on the 17th also underscores their importance. Both Roshchin and IZVESTIYA conclude that apart from these key questions, the conference must press forward with its work on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, the "main task" assigned it by the UN General Assembly.

The TASS account of the opening session briefly reports that chief U.S. negotiator Smith "submitted a summary of the United States' views on a number of problems and tasks facing the committee," but it does not elaborate. Smith had in fact suggested that the conferees discuss chemical and bacteriological weapons separately, a tack which in the past has drawn fire in Soviet propaganda.

A NEW TIMES commentary by NOVOSTI correspondent Beglov conveys a note of optimism about the talks. As summarized by TASS on 11 February, the article notes that the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation began in a "businesslike atmosphere" and concludes that these talks in Helsinki and Vienna "should be taken as fresh encouragement for further efforts within the framework of the disarmament committee."

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## WEST GERMANY

## STOPH LETTER PRESSURES BRANDT TO NEGOTIATE FIRST WITH GDR

A concerted effort to pressure West German Chancellor Brandt into negotiating first and foremost with the GDR, rather than with the USSR or Poland, seems reflected in propaganda treatment of GDR Premier Stoph's 12 February letter to Brandt calling for GDR-FRG summit negotiations in Berlin on short notice. A common theme running through commentaries on the Stoph letter in East Berlin, Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague media is that such negotiations would be the best proof that Brandt's words will be followed by deeds showing a sincere desire for East-West detente. At the same time, Moscow has broadcast its first commentary dealing explicitly with the present Gromyko-Bahr talks. Moscow is silent so far, however, on the new Soviet proposal for four-power talks on Berlin.

## STOPH LETTER

There is no immediate reaction available from East German or Soviet media to West German DPA reports on 18 February that Chancellor Brandt is ready to meet GDR Premier Stoph in East Berlin in the second or third week of March, following preparatory meetings by lower-level officials between 23 and 27 February. Stoph's 12 February letter to Brandt, publicized by GDR and Soviet media on the day it was sent, was notable principally for the urgency it attached to a meeting at the top level within one to two weeks.\* Stoph argued that the meeting should take place "as soon as possible" because of its "urgency and fundamental importance," and he suggested that Brandt and he meet in "the GDR capital, Berlin," on 19 or 26 February for "direct negotiations." These talks would seek "to bring about peaceful coexistence and a treaty settlement on normal relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of the generally recognized norms of international law"--a stock GDR demand for years.

Stoph's letter otherwise was devoted to listing standard GDR planks for a GDR-FRG treaty, references to the new GDR draft treaty proposed by Ulbricht on 18 December 1969, and recriminations against Brandt and his government for failing to respond to Ulbricht's December proposals. Although acknowledging that Brandt's 22 January 1970 letter expressed readiness to negotiate with the GDR "on the basis of equality of rights and nondiscrimination," Stoph argued that this

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\* The present Stoph proposal displays considerably more urgency than a similar suggestion on 19 September 1967. At that time Stoph suggested that two state secretaries make technical preparations for talks; earlier proposals in May and July 1967 had suggested, respectively, that this be done by foreign ministers or simply "representatives" of the two governments.

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"requires" the two countries to "recognize and respect one another mutually" as "sovereign subjects of international law with equal rights." In a subsequent ambiguous passage Stoph appeared to attach a stiff condition for negotiations. He wrote that "negotiations on the opening of relations of equal rights and on the renunciation of force can lead to positive results only if based on mutual recognition under international law."

In sharp contrast with Moscow's handling of its own preliminary "exchanges of opinions" between FRG State Secretary Bahr and Foreign Minister Gromyko, which continue to be virtually ignored, the Soviet central press published Stoph's letter on the 13th and 14th (PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA carrying virtual text), and Moscow radio commentaries for German and other listeners repeatedly referred to this "very important GDR initiative." While conceding that the Brandt government's approach has differed somewhat from that of his predecessors, Glazunov told German listeners on the 13th that "regrettably" the Bonn leaders "have so far failed to take a clear stand regarding this absolutely clear problem" of bilateral recognition, which he said raises suspicions that the "old sole representation presumption" is still embraced by Bonn.

Warsaw's PAP carried a Bonn-dated dispatch on the 13th reporting optimistically that Brandt would "express his readiness to go" to Berlin for talks, or possibly would propose a preparatory meeting at a lower level prior to a Brandt-Stoph meeting. The report noted that rejection of the Stoph invitation "would undermine to a considerable degree the credibility of West German assurances on their readiness to negotiate." Prague's RUDE PRAVO expressed similar views on the 14th, according to CTK, declaring that the talks "must be between heads of governments" and that Brandt's rejection of talks at that level "would mean a transparent obstruction and would show that it is only defensive diplomatic maneuvering aimed at misleading the public, rather than interest in achieving progress in mutual relations." CTK also reported PRACE of the 14th as calling Brandt's reply to Stoph "a public test of the sincerity of the new elements of Brandt's eastern policy."

SOVIET-FRG TALKS      Moscow's first comment on the Soviet-West German talks on a renunciation-of-force treaty since their inception in early December comes in an Andreyev commentary broadcast for German listeners on the 17th. Andreyev assails West Germany's CSU leader Strauss and the "neo-nazis" aligned with him for opposing the talks and denies their allegations of a "sellout" and a "so-called betrayal" by FRG spokesman Egon Bahr in Moscow. The commentator insists that a "possible agreement" on reciprocal recognition of borders "does not involve any sellout" and asserts that

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the FRG now has no choice but to assess the world situation "more realistically." He adds that the present Moscow negotiations provide the FRG with an opportunity to improve its relations with the USSR, which would be an "important" turning point and "a significant phase" in improving the situation in Europe.

Soviet media so far have not reported the "interruption" of the Gromyko-Bahr talks in Moscow on 17 February, reported by the West German DPA, or the fact that Bahr returned to Bonn on the 18th to attend the cabinet meeting dealing with the Stoph letter. Moscow has, however, publicly acknowledged the upgraded importance implicitly attached to Bahr's Moscow discussions by reporting that Premier Konygin received Bahr in the Kremlin on 13 February for "a conversation on questions of mutual interest." Curiously, of the Moscow central newspapers only PRAVDA failed to publish the report of the Konygin-Bahr meeting on the front page; PRAVDA relegated it to page two.

TASS and all the central papers reported that FRG Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Scheel stepped over in Moscow en route to India on 12 February and that the German delegation talked with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov at the airport.

USSR NOTES      Soviet media to date have not publicized the new  
ON BERLIN      Soviet notes to the United States, Britain, and France  
                 proposing four-power talks in Berlin on improving the  
situation there, although GDR and Polish media have acknowledged them.  
The brief East Berlin ADN report on the 11th points out that the  
USSR proposes ambassadorial-level talks in the former Allied Control  
Council building in West Berlin "in the near future." A Warsaw  
SLOWO POWSZECHNE comment on the notes, carried by PAP on the 13th,  
warns that if the Western powers only wish to discuss "Berlin as  
a unity" and do not intend to "recognize the GDR's sovereign right  
to East Berlin," this "fiction" would prove the three powers had  
decided in advance to "torpedo the talks" on this "real and urgent  
matter."

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## AFRICA

## ROGERS TOUR DRAWS ROUTINE ATTACKS FROM MOSCOW, PEKING

MOSCOW COMMENT Soviet propaganda hews to routine themes in decrying Secretary Rogers' tour of Africa as further evidence of a U.S. foreign policy of interference and aggressiveness worldwide. In a typical comment, Kudryavtsev, a frequent commentator on African affairs, writes in IZVESTIYA on 6 February of growing U.S. interest in Africa and adds that the United States is "stepping up its struggle against the national liberation movement of the African peoples." Kudryavtsev suggests that the trip may have been motivated by concern over U.S. economic and strategic interests in the wake of the Nigerian events, the loss of the U.S. air base in Libya, and the nationalization of Western property by some African governments.

As in other Soviet comment, Kudryavtsev notes that the Secretary is trying to "popularize" the Guam doctrine in Africa but reiterates the Soviet propaganda portrayal of the doctrine as in fact a camouflage for continuing interference and states that the U.S. goal "of establishing the world hegemony of American imperialism" remains unchanged.

A panelist in a Moscow domestic service roundtable discussion on 15 February says the tour is in part a reaction to adverse African sentiment aroused by U.S. support for the "Israeli aggressors" in the Middle East. Rogers' trip, the panelist says, is "a sort of fire-fighting operation" designed to strengthen the U.S. position in some Arab countries in North Africa by pitting them against other Arab states on the Arab-Israeli issue. Like Kudryavtsev, this commentator dismisses the idea that the Secretary's tour may presage a change in U.S. African policy, alleging that Rogers' statements in Addis Ababa were "clearly demagogic, aimed at a cheap effect, and incapable of standing up against the solid deeds of the United States in Africa."

Soviet broadcasts to African audiences play up hostile demonstrators and emphasize charges that the tour is designed to promote U.S. economic exploitation of African states. Despite the Secretary's statements to the contrary, Moscow tells African listeners, the United States is "colluding" with racist and colonial regimes in Africa while it continues to persecute its own black citizens in the United States. A typical broadcast on 6 February warns against the danger of accepting U.S. aid, concluding with a reminder that "the Americans are oppressors who will never change."

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NCNA ATTACK      The only monitored Peking reaction to date comes in a 17 February NCNA commentary on Rogers' "counterrevolutionary visit" to Africa. NCNA conventionally describes the United States as "the most ferocious vampire preying on the African people" and interprets the visit as a further attempt to promote U.S. exploitation of African resources. Enumerating U.S. sins on the continent, NCNA says the Americans supported the "Mobutu puppet clique" and the "Portuguese colonialists" and "suppressed the people of Congo (Kinshasa)." NCNA comments that the "setback" the Secretary received in Morocco and Tunisia indicates that a revolutionary current is raging in Africa and that the people are "awakening" to "the ugly features of U.S. imperialism."

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